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I 
PARTIES TO THE APPEAL 
The parties to this Appeal are the Appellant Tracy L. Southwick 
and the Appellees Frank Leone and Sam Leone (hereinafter, "the 
Leones"). Christine Montoya was also a party to the litigation at the 
trial court level, however, it is unknown if she will be participating 
in this appeal. 
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V 
STATEMENT OF DISPUTED FACTS 
1. Mr. Southwick disputes the assertion of fact contained in 
paragraph 9 of the Leones' Statement of Facts. Contrary to the 
Leonesf assertion, the record does not establish, as a fact, that Mr. 
Southwick failed to provide either the Leones or any of the Leone 
family members with a copy of the amended divorce complaint. Page 
105 of the record is simply Mr. Hadley's argument, contained in his 
memorandum in support of the Leones' Motion to Determine that Mr. 
Southwick has no Interest in the P.O.D. Account or insurance proceeds. 
Pages 143-145 is the amended divorce complaint. Neither of those 
documents establish, as a matter of fact, that the Leones were not 
provided a copy of the amended divorce complaint. Mr. Hadley's 
assertion that the Leones did not receive a copy of the amended 
complaint i s not even contained in the statement of facts in his 
memorandum. I t i s simply argument. The amended complaint does not 
establish as a fact that the Leones were not given a copy of the 
amended complaint.1 
2. Mr. Southwick also objects to paragraph No. 24 of the 
Leones' Statement of Facts, contained in their Brief. Contrary to the 
Leones' assertion, pages 72-73 of the record do not refer to any 
alleged conversation between Sam Leone and Mr. Southwick and do not 
establish that Mr. Southwick stated that: "whatever he brought into 
the marriage was his and whatever [Catherine Leone] brought into the 
marriage was hers." Page 72 of the record is the second page of an 
annual accounting, and page 73 is the first page of a petition for 
approval of annual accounting. 
Mr. Southwick disputes the assertions contained in paragraphs 1-5, set forth on pages 21-23 of the Leones' Brief In paragraph 
1, the Leones assert, without any factual basis or citation to the record, that Mr. Southwick never indicated he was making a claim to the P.O.D. 
account prior to Mrs. Southwick's death. 
In paragraph 2, the Leones falsely assert that pages 72-73 of the record establish that Mr. Southwick had a meeting wherein he stated that 
"whatever he brought into the marriage was his and whatever [Catherine] brought into the marriage was hers." Page 72 of the record is the last page 
of an annual accounting. Page 73 is the first page of a Petition for Approval of an Annual Accounting. 
In paragraph 3, the Leones falsely assert that the record at pages 105, 139-141 and 143-145 establish that neither the Leones nor any 
Leone family member was provided a copy of the amended complaint of divorce. Page 105 of the record is simply Mr. Hadley's argument contained 
in his memorandum in support of the Leones' Motion to Determine that Mr. Southwick has no interest in the P.O.D. Account. Pages 143-145 is the 
amended divorce complaint. Neither of those documents establish as a matter of fact that the Leones were not provided a copy of the amended 
complaint Mr. Hadley's assertion that the Leones did not receive a copy of the amended complaint is not even contained in his statement of facts in his 
memorandum. It is simply argument. The amended complaint does not establish as a fact that the Leones were not given a copy of the amended 
complaint 
Mr. Southwick also disputes the assertions contained in paragraph No. 4, wherein the Leones assert that Mr. Southwick "abandoned" Mrs. 
Southwick. There is no evidence in the record that Mr. Southwick abandoned Mrs. Southwick. Pages 56-57 are Mr. Southwick's Demand for 
Payment There is nothing in the Demand establishing that Mr. Southwick abandoned Mrs. Southwick. Pages 96-117 are the Leones Motion and 
Memorandum to Determine that Mr. Southwick had no interest in the P.O D. account and insurance proceeds. They do not establish any fact and 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE BURIAL PLOT, 
BURIAL EXPENSES, CO-CONSERVATOR FEES, TELEVISION & ANTENNA, 
AND COURT COSTS WERE LEGITIMATE EXPENSES FOR MRS. 
SOUTHWICK'S NECESSARY SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE. THE TRIAL 
COURT FURTHER ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CONCLUDING THAT 
THE LEONES WERE ENTITLED TO ANY AWARD OF CONSERVATOR'S 
FEES, AND THAT THE LEONES ARE NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE TO 
MR. SOUTHWICK FOR THE FUNDS FROM THE P.O.D. ACCOUNT THEY GAVE TO MS. 
MONTOYA 
POINT I 
MR. SOUTHWICK DOES NOT NEED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DECISION WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
C o n t r a r y t o t h e A p p e l l e e ' s a s s e r t i o n s , Mr. Sou thwick d o e s n o t 
n e e d t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n i n t h i s m a t t e r was 
c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s i n o r d e r t o p r e v a i l on t h i s A p p e a l . While i t i s 
t r u e t h a t Mr. Sou thwick c h a l l e n g e s c e r t a i n f a c t u a l c o n c l u s i o n s of t h e 
t r i a l c o u r t , Mr. S o u t h w i c k ' s Appea l i s p r i m a r i l y b a s e d on a s s e r t i o n s 
t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d a s a m a t t e r of law i n making t h e d e c i s i o n s 
and r u l i n g s t h a t a r e on a p p e a l i n t h i s p r o c e e d i n g . T h e r e f o r e , and 
c o n t r a r y t o t h e A p p e l l e e ' s a s s e r t i o n i n P o i n t I of t h e i r B r i e f , t h e 
p r o v i s i o n s of Rule 52 of t h e Utah Ru le s of C i v i l P r o c e d u r e a r e n o t 
c o n t r o l l i n g i n t h i s m a t t e r . T h i s Cour t i s f r e e t o i g n o r e t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n s of law and a p p l y t h e a p p r o p r i a t e law t o t h e f a c t s 
of t h i s c a s e and e n t e r a c o r r e c t d e c i s i o n . 
POINT n 
THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE LEONES ARE NOT 
LIABLE TO MR. SOUTHWICK FOR HIS SHARE OF THE P O D . ACCOUNT THEY 
IMPROPERLY AND UNLAWFULLY DISTRIBUTED TO MS. MONTOYA. 
The Leones f a l s e l y a s s e r t t o t h i s Cour t t h a t Mr. Sou thwick i s 
making h i s c l a i m a g a i n s t t h e A p p e l l e e s a s " c o - g u a r d i a n s / c o -
conservators." The assertion is a knowing falsehood and a deliberate 
effort to mislead this Court.2 Pages 24-25 of Mr. Southwick's Brief 
do not, as asserted by the Leones, state that Mr. Southwick's claim 
against the Leones is in their alleged capacity as co-conservators/co-
guardians. On pages 24-25 Mr. Southwick simply asserts that during 
the time the Leones acted as co-conservators/co-guardians, the Leones 
breached their fiduciary duty to Mr. Southwick. 
Mr. Southwick has maintained from the time he first asked for his 
rightful share of the P.O.D. account and his share of the insurance 
policy that the Leones had no authority to act as co-conservators/co-
guardians of Mrs. Southwick after her death. Judge Bohling 
specifically ruled, in denying the Appellee's request for attorney's 
fees, that subsequent to her death, the Leones had no authority to act 
as co-conservators/co-guardians on behalf of Mrs. Southwick. (Record, 
page 699). The Appellees did not appeal that decision and are now 
estopped to challenge it. 
Furthermore, the Leones have not challenged or attempted, in 
anyway whatsoever, to dispute the authority cited by Mr. Southwick in 
his Brief or in his memoranda filed in the trial court, that a 
guardian's/conservator's power and authority terminates on the death 
of the ward and have in fact admitted that they had no authority to 
act on behalf of Mrs. Southwick or her estate after her death. 
(Leones' Brief, page 45). Therefore, the Leones have conceded, as a 
matter of law, that their power and authority to act as co-
2 Footnote 2 of the Leones' Brief is a deliberate misrepresentation of the facts. Mr. Southwick filed his request for payment with the 
Leones as conservators because they had the obligation to pay according to the terms of the P.O.D. account. However, after they refused to do so and 
proceeded with litigation and gave the P.O.D. funds to Ms. Montoya, they were acting not as conservators but as individuals, and they are liable to Mr. 
Southwick as individuals. 
ardians/co-conservators of Mrs. Southwick terminated at her death. 
Because it is undisputed that the Leones1 power to act as co-
nservators/co-guardians for Mrs. Southwick terminated at her death, 
L of the Leones1 references to the standard of care and duties of a 
iservator are irrelevant. As a matter of law, the Leones were not 
:ing as co-conservators/co-guardians at the time they refused to pay 
Southwick his lawful share of the P.O.D. account, at the time they 
*ed Mr. Hadley to represent the estate, at the time they changed the 
Leficiaries on the insurance policy issued to Mrs. Southwick, at the 
.e they pursued litigation to prevent Mr. Southwick from obtaining 
rightful share of the P.O.D. account, and at the time they gave 
Southwickfs share of the P.O.D. account to Ms. Montoya. Judge 
ich's ruling that the Leones are not personally liable to Mr. 
thwick is simply legally incorrect. 
The Leones' sole power and authority after Mrs. Southwick1s death 
to pay the proceeds of the P.O.D. account to the beneficiaries of 
account. They had no power or authority to determine the validity 
.ny claim on the P.O.D. account. They had no authority to litigate 
validity of any claim to the account. If the Leones questioned 
Southwickfs right to a share of the P.O.D. account, their duty was 
eposit the money with the trial court in this case, file an 
rpleader action and deposit the P.O.D. funds with the court in 
case, as the insurance company did with the insurance proceeds, 
Let the beneficiaries litigate ownership of the P.O.D. account or 
rer the P.O.D. funds to the personal representative of Mrs. 
lwick's estate for a determination of what to do with the P.O.D. 
int. 
The Leones were not appointed to act as the personal 
representative(s) of Mrs. Southwick's estate. They never sought any 
such appointment. Furthermore, because the P.O.D. account was not 
property of Mrs. Southwick1s estate, the Leones never had any power or 
legal authority to litigate the legitimacy of any claims to the P.O.D. 
account, even had they been appointed as co-personal representatives 
of Mrs. Southwick's estate. 
The Leones had no authority of any kind to deny Mr. Southwick his 
lawful share of the P.O.D. account. They had no authority of any kind 
to litigate Mr. Southwick's claim to a portion of the P.O.D. account. 
They had no authority of any kind to give the proceeds of the P.O.D. 
account to Ms. Montoya. 
Because the Leones had no authority to deny Mr. Southwick his 
lawful share of the P.O.D. account, to litigate Mr. Southwick's claim 
to a portion of the P.O.D. account or to give the proceeds of the 
P.O.D. account to Ms. Montoya, the Leones are personally liable to Mr. 
Southwick for his share of the P.O.D. account they unlawfully and 
improperly gave to Ms. Montoya. The trial court committed prejudicial 
and reversible error when it concluded that the Leones were not 
personally liable to Mr. Southwick for giving his lawful share of the 
P.O.D. account to Ms. Montoya. Therefore, the trial court's decision 
must be reversed, with directions that it enter an order finding the 
Leones personally liable to Mr. Southwick for his portion of the 
P.O.D. account they improperly and unlawfully gave to Ms. Montoya. 
POINT III 
THE LEONES' ASSERTION THAT MR. SOUTHWICK DISCLAIMED ANY RIGHT TO THE 
POD. ACCOUNT IS NOT ONLY FALSE, IT IS AN ASSERTION THAT WAS NEVER MADE AT 
THE TRIAL COURT LEVEL AND, THEREFORE, IS IMPROPERLY ASSERTED AT THIS TIME. 
The Leones are again attempting to illicit sympathy from this 
Court by claiming that Mr. Southwick was dishonest and immoral in the 
manner in which he obtained his divorce from Mrs. Southwick. That 
assertion is not only nonsense, it was addressed by this Court in Mr. 
Southwick's first appeal to this Court and found to be untrue. In his 
first appeal, this Court specifically found that Mr. Southwick 
obtained the divorce from Mrs. Southwick for her best interest. (In 
Re the Estate of Leone, 860 P.2d 973, 978 (Utah App. 1993), footnote 
2.) 
The Leones' assertion that Mr. Southwick waived any right to the 
P.O.D. account is also nonsense. This Court has already ruled as a 
matter of law that Mr. Southwick is entitled to one-half of the P.O.D. 
account, the Leones' assertions not withstanding. Furthermore, the 
Leones never raised this assertion in the trial court, and they cannot 
raise it now for the first time. However, even assuming, arguendo, 
that the Leones had timely raised Mr. SouthwickTs alleged waiver of 
any claim to the P.O.D. account, they have no evidence to support that 
spurious and disingenuous assertion. 
The Leones' claim that paragraph No. 8 of Mr. Southwick1s Divorce 
Petition proves that Mr. Southwick was disclaiming any right to the 
P.O.D. account. That paragraph proves nothing more than the fact that 
Mr. Southwick1s attorney did not recognize or realize Mr. Southwick1s 
right to a share of the P.O.D. account when he prepared the divorce 
petition. 
The Leones then assert that the amended divorce petition with a 
changed paragraph No. 8 indicates fraud and deceit on the part of Mr. 
Southwick. Contrary, to the Leones' assertions, all the amended 
petition demonstrates is that, after preparing the divorce petition, 
Mr. Southwick's attorney recognized his mistake with respect to the 
P.O.D. account and corrected that mistake in the amended petition. 
Again, the issue of Mr. Southwick1s reason for, and method of, 
obtaining a divorce from Mrs. Southwick has been addressed by this 
Court and the Leones are estopped to rehash the conclusion in this 
Appeal. 
The Leones also make the incredulous assertion that Mr. Southwick 
is negligent for relinquishing his signature authority on the P.O.D. 
account. That assertion is so inane it is mind-boggling. The Leones 
would only agree to Mr. Southwick1s appointment as 
conservator/guardian of Mrs. Southwick if Mr. Southwick relinquished 
his right as a signatory on the account at the time he resigned as 
guardian/conservator. Therefore, the Leones cannot, now ask this 
Court to find that Mr. Southwick was negligent because he relinquished 
his signature authority on the P.O.D. account, rather than retaining 
it, in order to prevent the Leones from misusing, co-mingling and 
improperly distributing the proceeds of the P.O.D. account. Such an 
assertion is utter nonsense. It was never raised at the trial court, 
and it cannot be raised at this time in this proceeding. 
POINT IV 
THE LEONES' ASSERTION THAT MR. SOUTHWICK IS TO BLAME FOR FAILING TO 
PROTECT THE POD. ACCOUNT IS LUDICROUS. 
The Leones assert that Mr. Southwick should have protected the 
P.O.D. account by filing a supersedeas bond under the provisions of 
Rule 62 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter, "Rule 62"). 
The Leones ask this Court to ignore that the mere filing of a 
supersedeas bond does not automatically result in a stay. In 
pertinent part, Rule 62 states: 
When appeal is taken the Appellant by giving a supersedeas bond may obtain a stay, 
unless such stay is otherwise prohibited by law of these rules. The bond may be given at 
or after the time of filing the notice of appeal. (Emphas i s added) . 
A stay may be conditioned upon the filing of a bond, but the mere 
filing of a bond does not guarantee a stay, as the Leones imply. Nor 
is a supersedeas bond required in order to obtain a stay. The 
decision as to whether a supersedeas bond is required on an appeal 
rests with the trial court in the first instance, and contrary to the 
Leones' implication, under no circumstances can a stay be obtained 
without first filing a motion for a stay. 
The Leones' assertion that Mr. Southwick should have filed a 
supersedeas bond to protect the P.O.D. account is nothing more than a 
spurious and disingenuous attempt on the part of the Leones to 
distract this Court from their unlawful and improper actions. Filing 
of a supersedeas bond would have been useless and senseless. The 
P.O.D. account was security enough. No bond needed to be filed. Mr. 
Southwick was not attempting to preclude another party from enforcing 
a judgment against him or to preclude another party from engaging in 
some activity, which the preclusion therefrom would have resulted in 
harm to the other party. Mr. Southwick was only attempting to 
preclude his lawful share of the P.O.D. account from being distributed 
pending resolution of his claim to the account by this Court. 
The Leones are also asking this Court to ignore the fact that the 
Leones gave the proceeds of the P.O.D. account to Ms. Montoya after 
Mr. Southwick had filed a Motion for a Stay of Distribution and while 
this case was on appeal. Are the Leones asking this Court to believe 
that they would not have given the money to Ms. Montoya if Mr. 
Southwick had filed a supersedeas bond? Why should this Court believe 
that the Leones would have acted any differently if Mr. Southwick had 
filed a supersedeas bond? Would the trial court's decision have 
changed somehow? Would their counsel's advice concerning their right 
to give the proceeds of the P.O.D. account to Ms. Montoya have 
changed? Would the Leones have waited until after the trial court 
ruled on Mr. Southwick's Motion for a Stay of distribution before 
giving the proceeds of the P.O.D. account to Ms. Montoya? 
If anything, by filing a supersedeas bond, Mr. Southwick would 
have given the Leones more justification to give the proceeds of the 
P.O.D. account to Ms. Montoya. After all, there would have then been 
a supersedeas bond on which Mr. Southwick could make a claim. Of 
course, he would have been paying himself, since he would have to pay 
for the bond. 
If the Leones were willing to give the proceeds of the P.O.D. 
account to Ms. Montoya, knowing that the trial court's decision was on 
appeal and knowing the a Motion for Stay of Distribution had been 
filed and was pending, there is absolutely no evidence or implication 
that the Leones would have acted any differently if Mr. Southwick had 
filed a supersedeas bond. The only thing that would have been 
different is that Mr. Southwick would have wasted the time, effort and 
expense of obtaining a bond. If Mr. Southwick wanted to pay himself 
his share of the P.O.D. account he never would have made a claim on 
the Account or maintained this litigation. 
It is an undisputed fact that Mr. Southwick sought and was given 
a stay. The trial court did not condition that stay on Mr. Southwick 
filing a supersedeas bond. The Leones knowingly and intentionally 
gave the proceeds of the P.O.D. account to Ms. Montoya while this case 
was on appeal and while Mr. Southwickfs Motion for a Stay was pending. 
(Record, page 851). Had Mr. Southwick filed a supersedeas bond, it 
would have been useless. 
The Leones had no authority to distribute the proceeds of the 
P.O.D. account to Ms. Montoya, bond or no bond. Therefore, they are 
personally liable to Mr. Southwick for his share of the P.O.D. account 
they unlawfully and improperly gave to Ms. Montoya. 
The Leones knew at the time the unlawfully transferred the P.O.D 
funds to Ms. Montoya they had no right to do so. They even sought to 
transfer the responsibility for their unlawful actions to Ms. Montoya 
by making her sign a document absolving them of any liability for 
transferring the money to her. (Record, page 308) .3 The Leones also 
entered into an agreement with Ms. Montoya whereby she agreed to set 
aside a certain portion of the P.O.D. funds given her in the event Mr. 
Southwick prevailed on his appeal to this Court. (Record, pages 806-
807). The trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error when 
it concluded that the Leones were not personally liable to Mr. 
Southwick for giving his lawful share of the P.O.D. account to Ms. 
The Leones' actions clearly contradicts their assertion that they did not believe that they had any liability to Mr. Southwick. Why 
would they have insisted that Ms. Montoya set aside part of the P.O.D. account in the event Mr. Southwick's appeal was successful, if they believed 
they were acting within their legal rights and in conjunction with the trial court's order? Why would the have required Ms. Montoya to sign 
an agreement absolving them of any liability in connection with the P.O.D. funds, if they believed they had no liability to Mr. Southwick? 
Montoya. Therefore, the trial court's decision must be reversed and 
with directions that it enter an order finding the Leones personally 
liable to Mr. Southwick for his portion of the P.O.D. account they 
improperly and unlawfully gave to Ms. Montoya. 
POINT V 
THE FACTS INDISPUTABLY ESTABLISH THAT THE LEONES CONVERTED THE PROCEEDS 
OF THE POD. ACCOUNT. 
It is undisputed that the Leones converted the proceeds of the 
P.O.D. account. First the Leones, in violation of the trial court's 
order of March 2, 1988 and the February 3, 1988 Stipulation filed with 
the trial court, took the funds of the P.O.D. account out of the bank 
in which they were deposited, placed them in their personal account(s) 
and then proceeded to invest the proceeds in the bond market. 
(Record, page 585). Next the Leones, without any authority of any 
nature whatsoever, paid to themselves the sums of $17,000.00 and 
$13,000.00 in conservator's fees. (Record, page 588). And finally, 
without any legal authority of any type, the Leones improperly and 
unlawfully gave Ms. Montoya the proceeds of the P.O.D. account. 
The Leones may have returned a portion or even all of the funds 
they converted from the P.O.D. account to their own uses, after 
playing in the bond market, and they may have returned a portion or 
all of the monies they improperly and unlawfully paid themselves as 
conservator's fees, but that does not change the fact that they 
violated the March 2, 1988 court order, used the funds, unlawfully 
paid themselves conservator's fees and invest in the bond market. 
The Leones' assertion that their conversion of the P.O.D. account 
funds was.pursuant to a court order is a deliberate misstatement of 
fact and law. As previously set forth in this Brief, the Leones never 
had any authority to do anything with respect to the P.O.D. account or 
the estate of Mrs. Southwick after her death other than to pay the 
proceeds of the P.O.D. account to the beneficiaries or to file an 
interpleader action. They never had any authority to take the funds 
of the P.O.D account out of the bank and invest them in the bond 
market, and they never had any authority to give the funds to Ms. 
Montoya. 
The Leones were not the personal representatives of Mrs. 
Southwick1s estate. They had no authority to act on behalf of the 
estate of Mrs. Southwick after her death. They had no authority to 
pay expenses on behalf of the estate. Their sole power and authority 
was to pay the funds of the P.O.D. account to the beneficiaries and to 
turn-over all other assets of Mrs. Southwick1s estate to the personal 
representative. They had no power or authority to appoint themselves 
personal representatives of the estate of Mrs. Southwick, and they had 
no power to make any decisions or take any actions on behalf of the 
estate of Mrs. Southwick. 
Because the Leones had no legal authority to act on behalf of the 
estate of Mrs. Southwick, subsequent to her death, because the Leones1 
authority as co-guardians/co-conservators terminated at Mrs. 
Southwick1s death, and because the P.O.D. account was never a part of 
Mrs. Southwick's estate, any use of the P.O.D. account funds, by the 
Leones, subsequent to Mrs. Southwickfs death, was unlawful. Because 
the Leones unlawfully used, converted and then paid the proceeds of 
the P.O.D. account to Ms. Montoya, they are personally liable to Mr. 
Southwick for that conversion. 
Therefore, the trial court committed prejudicial and reversible 
error with it concluded that the Leones were not personally liable to 
Mr. Southwick for giving his lawful share of the P.O.D. account to Ms. 
Montoya. The trial court's decision must be reversed and with 
directions that it enter an order finding the Leones are personally 
liable to Mr. Southwick for his portion of the P.O.D. account they 
improperly and unlawfully gave to Ms. Montoya. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT VARIOUS EXPENSES WHICH WERE 
NOT FOR MRS. SOUTHWICK'S SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE COULD BE CHARGED 
AGAINST THE POD ACCOUNT. 
The Leones assert in Point III of their brief that Mr. 
Southwick is asserting that the P.O.D. account could only be used for 
Mrs. Southwickfs medical care and treatment. That statement is 
partially correct. Mr. Southwick is asserting, as stipulated by the 
parties to the February 3, 1988 Stipulation and March 2, 1988 Order, 
filed in this matter, that the P.O.D. funds can only be used for Mrs. 
Southwick1s medical expenses or other expenses incurred for the 
necessary support and maintenance of Mrs. Southwick. (Record, page 
20, 1 4; page 29, 1 2). Moreover, Judge Rokich specifically stated at 
trial of this matter that the Leones were entitled to use all moneys 
above the $4 6,000.00 in the P.O.D. account in any way they deemed 
necessary for Mrs. Southwick's benefit. However, if the Leones wanted 
to use any of the funds of the P.O.D. account, they had to establish 
that the use was for a "necessary medical expense." (Record, page 
827, lines 6-8). 
Judge Rokich is the judge who signed the March 2, 198 8 Order. He 
is the proper person to interpret its meaning and applicability. His 
statement that the Leones could only use the P.O.D. funds for 
necessary medical expenses is a proper and controlling interpretation 
of the March 2, 1988 Order, as well as the February 3, 1988 
Stipulation. Therefore, it is Judge Rokich who is stating that the 
P.O.D. account can only be used to pay expenses for medical care and 
treatment, not Mr. Southwick. Although, Mr. Southwick agrees with 
Judge Rokich's interpretation of the March 2, 1988 Order, as well as 
the February 3, 1988 Stipulation, specifying that the P.O.D account 
can only be used for payment of medical expenses care and treatment. 
The Leones assert that "support and maintenance", as used in the 
March 2, 1988 Order, as well as the February 3, 1988 Stipulation means 
anything the Leones deem proper. Support is defined as that which 
furnishes a livelihood; a source or means of living; subsistence, 
sustenance, or living. Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, 1979, 
page 1291. Maintenance is defined as the furnishing by one person to 
another, of the means of living, or food, clothing, shelter, etc. 
Blume v. State Board of Education of Montana, 97 Mont. 371, 34 P.2d 
515, 519. Support and maintenance includes food, clothing, shelter 
and basic necessities of life, as well as reasonable and necessary 
transportation expense, utility expenses, medical and drug expenses. 
Moss v. Moss, 379 S.2d 1206 (La.App. 1980). Food, drink, clothing 
medical attention and a suitable place of residence are allowable as 
necessaries. 39 C.J.S., Guardian & Ward, §65. 
Clearly, none of the alleged expenses to which Mr. Southwick 
objects were for Mrs. Southwick's means of living, food, clothing, 
shelter, subsistence, or sustenance. Therefore, by the express terms 
of the February 3, 1988 Stipulation and March 2, 1988 Order, they are 
not items that can be charged against the P.O.D. account. The Leones' 
attorney prepared both the Stipulation and Order. Therefore, they are 
now estopped to challenge or dispute its contents, intent or 
enforceability. 
Contrary to the Leones1 assertion they were not legally entitled 
to invade the P.O.D, account to pay any expenses without first 
establishing that there were not other funds from which those expenses 
could be paid. The Leones failed to do so. Therefore, they are 
precluded from asserting that their payment of any expenses were 
justified under the provisions of the February 3, 1988 Stipulation and 
the March 2, 1988 Order, even assuming, arguendo, they were legitimate 
expenses, which they were not. 
The Leones1 assertions to the contrary, Sam Leone never testified 
that the Leones did not have funds other than the P.O.D. account with 
which to pay Mrs. Southwick's expenses. (Leones1 brief, page 35). 
Sam Leone's testimony is simply that they had commingled the P.O.D. 
account with other funds of Mrs. Southwick. "It was out of the 
account. We did not consider it a P.O.D. Account at that time." 
(Record, page 786, lines 4-5). 
Assuming, arguendo, that the assertions in the Leones' Brief are 
correct, Sam Leone's testimony to the contrary, it is an undisputed 
fact that the Leones had other funds available with which to pay Mrs. 
Southwick's expenses.4 As established by their own documents on file 
in this matter, the Leones received at least $16,700.00 during the 
Sam Leones' testimony does not establish any fact, especially when it is contradicted by his own documentation and admissions of his 
counsel made in court. (Record, page 831). 
Lute they were acting as co-conservators/co-guardians for Mrs. 
Duthwick. (Record, 831, lines 21-22). Therefore, Sam Leone's 
sstimony that the Leones had no funds other than the P.O.D. account 
.th which to pay Mrs. Southwick's expenses is disingenuous at best. 
The Leones' assertion that other funds received on Mrs. 
•uthwick's behalf during the time they were acting as co-
nservators/co-guardians were used to pay Mrs. Southwick's nursing 
re costs is simply not true. (Leones1 brief, page 36, footnote 10). 
the Leones1 own records only $5,2 69.68 of the funds received by the 
ones during the time they were acting as co-conservators/co-
ardians were used to pay Mrs. Southwick's nursing care costs, 
srefore, by the Leones own admissions, they had not less than 
L, 430.32 with which to pay for Mrs. Southwick's burial expenses. 
>cord, pages 585, 588). 
A. Burial Expenses. 
The trial court erred as a matter of fact and as a matter of law 
concluding that the cost of Mrs. Southwick's burial plot and burial 
n could be paid out of the P.O.D. account. Because the purchase of 
. Southwick's burial plot and her burial plan were not a "necessary 
ical expense" or for her necessary support and maintenance, those 
snses could not properly be charged to the P.O.D. account. Because 
Leones had access to other funds with which to pay Mrs. 
:hwick's burial costs, they are not legally entitled to invade the 
D. account for payment of those expenses. Therefore, the trial 
:t erred as a matter of fact and as a matter of law in concluding 
: the cost of Mrs. Southwick's burial plot and burial plan could be 
9H 
paid out of the P.O.D. account. That error was prejudicial and 
reversible. Consequently this Court must reverse the trial court's 
ruling that the costs of Mrs. Southwick's burial is chargeable to the 
P.O.D. account. 
B. Court Costs. 
The trial court clearly erred as a matter of fact and as a matter 
of law in concluding that the Leones1 court costs could be paid out of 
the P.O.D. account. It is an indisputable fact that the Leones' court 
costs, for what ever purpose, were not a necessary medical expense or 
for Mrs. Southwick's necessary support and maintenance. By the 
express terms of the February 3, 1998 Stipulation and the March 2, 
1988 Order, the LeonesT court costs could not properly be charged to 
the P.O.D. account. Judge Bohling correctly ruled that the Leones had 
no authority to take any action on behalf of the Estate of Mrs. 
Lsouthwick after her death, including hiring Mr. Hadley and 
prosecuting any legal action. (Record, page 699). Consequently, the 
trial court erred as a matter of fact and as a matter of law in 
concluding that the Leones1 court costs could be paid out of the 
P.O.D. account. That error was prejudicial and reversible. 
Therefore, this Court must reverse the trial court's ruling that the 
Leones' court costs are chargeable to the P.O.D. account. 
C. Television and antenna. 
The trial court again erred as a matter of fact and as a matter 
of law in concluding that the cost of the television and antenna could 
be paid out of the P.O.D. account. It is an undisputable fact, 
established by stipulation and court order, that Mrs. Southwick was 
comatose. (Record, page 19, 1 1; page 28, 11). By the express terms 
of the February 3, 1998 Stipulation and the March 2, 1988 Order, the 
cost of the television and antenna could not properly be charged to 
the P.O.D. account. Furthermore, Judge Rokich specifically ruled at 
trial of this matter that the cost of the television and antenna could 
not be charged to the P.O.D. account. (Record, page 385, lines 5-7, 
19-21). 
Because the purchase of the television and antenna was not a 
necessary medical expense or for Mrs. Southwick1s necessary support 
and maintenance, those purchases could not properly be charged to the 
P.O.D. account. Because the Leones had access to other funds with 
which to purchase the television and antenna, they were not legally 
entitled to invade the P.O.D. account for payment of those purchases. 
Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of fact and as a matter 
of law in concluding that the costs of the television and antenna 
could be paid out of the P.O.D. account. That error was prejudicial 
and reversible. Therefore, this Court must reverse the trial court's 
ruling that the Leones' court costs are chargeable to the P.O.D. 
account. 
This portion of Judge Rokich's memorandum decision declaring that 
the costs of the television and antenna could be charged to the P.O.D. 
account is particularly confusing because at trial he specifically 
ruled that the costs of the television and antenna could not be 
charged to the P.O.D. account. Yet, in his memorandum decision, he 
included those items as charges against the P.O.D. account. 
Unfortunately, Judge Rokich retired before an explanation of the 
contradiction of his in court ruling and his memorandum decision could 
be obtained. 
D. Conservator's Fees. 
The trial court further erred as a matter of fact and as a matter 
of law in concluding that any "conservator's fees" could be paid out 
of the P.O.D. account, even if the Leones were entitled to 
conservator's fees, which they are not. It is an undisputable fact, 
established by the February 3, 1988 Stipulation and the March 2, 1988 
Court Order, that any conservator's fees could not properly be charged 
to the P.O.D. account. It is undisputable that conservator's fees are 
not for Mrs. Southwick's necessary medical expense or for Mrs. 
Southwick's necessary support and maintenance. Furthermore, Judge 
Rokich specifically ruled at trial of this matter that only the costs 
of Mrs. Southwick's burial plot and burial plan could be charged to 
the P.O.D. account. (Record, page 385, lines 5-7, 19-21). 
Because the conservator's fees are not necessary medical expense 
or for Mrs. Southwick's necessary support and maintenance, those 
alleged expenses could not properly be charged to the P.O.D. account. 
Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of fact and as a matter 
of law in concluding that the Leones' alleged conservator's fees could 
be paid out of the P.O.D. account. That error was prejudicial and 
reversible. Therefore, this Court must reverse the trial court's 
ruling that the Leones' alleged conservator's fees are chargeable to 
the P.O.D. account.5 
The Leones assert that Mr. Southwick improperly requested conservators' fees while asserting that the Leones are not entitled to such 
fees. Mr. Southwick's Petition for Appointment as Conservator does contain a request for conservators. However, unlike the Leones request it was 
timely and appropriately filed with the trial court. It also was only for $2,500.00 not $30,000.00 plus as the Leones and unlike the Leones Mr. 
Southwick never paid himself any conservators fees. He received no fees. 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN AWARDING THE LEONES 
CONSERVATOR'S FEES, BECAUSE THE LEONES REQUEST FOR CONSERVATOR'S FEES 
WAS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Contrary to the Leones' assertion, their request for 
conservator's fees is clearly barred by the statute of limitations set 
forth in Utah Code §75-3-803 (hereinafter, "§75-5-803"). It is an 
undisputed fact that no personal representative was ever appointed for 
Mrs. Southwick's Estate. It is also an undisputed fact that no 
attorney was ever retained to represent any nonexistent personal 
representative of the Estate of Mrs. Southwick. It is a further 
undisputed fact and an undisputed conclusion of law that the Leones 
had no authority to hire Mr. Hadley as counsel for the Estate of Mrs. 
Southwick. (Record at page 699.) And it is an undisputed fact that 
the Leones' "Billing Requests'' were not filed with the trial court 
until February 21, 1992. (Record, pages 274, 279).6 
Utah Code §75-5-804 (hereinafter, "§75-5-804") specifies how 
claims against an estate must be presented. In pertinent part, §75-5-
804 (1) (a) declares: 
The claimant may deliver or mail to the personal representative, or the personal 
representative's attorney of record, a written statement of the claim indicating its basis, 
the name and address of the claimant, and the amount claimed, or may file a written 
statement of the claim, in the form prescribed by this rule, with the clerk of the court 
(Emphasis added). 
In this case, the Leones never filed any request for conservator's 
fees with the personal representative of the Estate of Mrs. Southwick, 
because there was no personal representative with which to file a 
6 Curiously, the Leones claim on appeal they presented their "Requests" to Mr. Hadley in April 1991 and that that presentment was 
sufficient to comply with the provisions of Utah Code §75-3-804. Yet, the Leones captioned their "Requests" to the Third District Court. If the 
Leones had truly intended to present their "Requests" to Mr. Hadley in April 1991 rather than to the court in 1992, it is extremely unlikely they would 
have captioned their "Requests" to the Third District Court. 
claim. The Leones, likewise, never filed any request for 
conservator's fees with the attorney of record for the personal 
representative of Mrs. Southwick1s Estate, again, because there was no 
attorney for the nonexistent personal representative of the Estate of 
Mrs. Southwick. 
Because there was no personal representative of the Estate of 
Mrs. Southwick and no attorney of record for the personal 
representative, the Leones could, as a matter of law, only make a 
claim for conservator's fees by filing such claims with the clerk of 
the court. They did so, but not for over thirteen months after Mrs. 
Southwick had died and not within the time periods mandated by §75-5-
803. 
Because the Leones' claims were not filed with the clerk of the 
court within the time mandated by §75-5-803, their claims are barred 
by the express provisions of §75-5-803. Because the Leones' claims 
for conservator's fees are barred by the express provisions of §75-5-
803, the trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error when 
it awarded the Leones conservator's fees. Therefore, this Court must 
reverse the trial court's award of conservator's fees, instruct the 
trial court to award Mr. Southwick his half of the conservator's fees 
improperly deducted from the P.O.D. account, and to hold the Leones 
personally liable to Mr. Southwick for the payment of Mr. Southwick's 
share of the P.O.D. account. 7 
The Leones assert in footnote 13 of their Brief that Mr. Southwick "again shows his willingness to distort the record." Without any 
citation to the record or an iota of evidence, the Leones assert that Mrs. Southwick was only in the Benion Care Center for approximately seven 
months. Yet they filed documents with the trial court alleging that they paid Benion Care Center for Mrs. Southwick's care from March 1990 through 
January 1991, a period of 11 months. (Record, pages 585, 588). 
POINT VIII 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CONCLUDING THAT THE LEONES 
HAD ANY AUTHORITY TO PAY ANY EXPENSES AFTER MRS. SOUTHWICK'S DEATH. 
In Point VI of their Brief the Leones admit that they had no 
authority to act on behalf of Mrs. Southwick or her estate, after her 
death,(Leones' Brief, page 45); yet, they assert that they had the 
legal right to pay bills allegedly incurred prior to Mrs. Southwick's 
death, even though those alleged expenses were not for Mrs. 
Southwick's medical needs or for her support and maintenance. The 
validity of the disputed expenses has been fully addressed previously 
in this Brief and will not be addressed again. 
If Mrs. Southwick and/or her estate had expenses to pay after her 
death, that responsibility rested with the personal representative of 
her estate, not with the Leones. The Leones' obligation was to turn-
over Mrs. Southwick's bills and funds to the personal representative 
of her estate, not to act as if they had been appointed personal 
representative. The Leones were represented by counsel. They should 
have known their legal authority and the limitations on that 
authority. Judge Rokich's statement that the Leones had authority to 
pay any obligations of Mrs. Southwick is simply incorrect. 
As previously set forth in this Brief, the trial court's judgment 
allowing expenses of Mrs. Southwick's burial, the cost of her burial 
plot, the costs of the television and antenna, the alleged court cost 
of the Leones, and conservator's fees to the Leones is improper and 
legally defective and must be reversed. 
VII 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
Because the trial court erred in concluding that the expenses for 
Mrs. Southwickfs burial plot, her burial expenses, the Leones Co-
conservator's fees, the purchase of a television & antenna, and court 
costs, were legitimate expenses for Mrs. Southwickfs medical expenses 
and/or necessary expenses for her support and maintenance and thus 
chargeable against the P.O.D. account the trial courts Judgment must 
be reversed. Because the trial court erred in computing Mr. 
Southwickfs share of the P.O.D. account, because the trial court erred 
as a matter of law in concluding that the Leones were entitled to 
conservator's fees, and because the trial court erred as a matter of 
law in concluding that the Leones were not personally liable to Mr. 
Southwick for his share of the P.O.D. account they unlawfully gave to 
Ms. Montoya, this Court must reverse the trial courts1 judgment and 
direct the trial court to enter judgment in favor of Mr. Southwick 
against the Leones, personally. This Court must also instruct the 
trial court enter a ruling that the Leones are not entitled to any 
conservator fees, and that the expenses for Mrs. Southwickfs burial 
plot, her burial expenses, the Leones Co-conservator fees, the pur-
chase of a television & antenna, and court costs allegedly incurred by 
the Leones, in their bad faith defense of Mr. Southwick1s claim to his 
rightful share of the P.O.D. account are not chargeable to the P.O.D. 
account. 
WHEREFORE, Mr. Southwick respectfully prays that this Court 
issue an order reversing the judgment of the trial court and declaring 
lat the Leones are not entitled to any conservator's fees in this 
itter, that the expenses for Mrs. Southwickfs burial plot, her burial 
cpenses, the Leones conservator's fees, the purchase of a television 
antenna, and court costs allegedly incurred by the Leones, in their 
d faith defense of Mr. Southwickfs claim to his rightful share of 
e P.O.D. account, are not chargeable against the P.O.D. account and 
at the Leones are personally liable to Mr. Southwick for his share 
the P.O.D. account they unlawfully gave to Ms. Montoya. 
Respectfully submitted th i s ^ day 
 of J u l y 1996. 
CharleTA Schultz 
Attorney for Tracy L. Southwick 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the <P day of July 1996, I served two 
true and correct copies of the foregoing Reply Brief to the persons at 
the addresses listed below by depositing a copy in the United States 
Mail, postage prepaid. 
James C. Lewis 
DIUMENTI Sc LEWIS 
505 South Main 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
William R. Hadley 
KUNZ, KUNZ, & HADLEY 
Attorney for Leones 
2225 East Murray Holliday Road, Suite 204 
SLC, UT 84117 
Kristine Montoya (Rogers) 
P.O. Box 3732 
Scottsdale, Arizona 85271-3732 
Charles A. Schultz 
ADDENDUM 
Statutes: 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 62 
Statutes: 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as Amended, §75-3-803 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as Amended, §75-3-804 
Rule 62 * UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 1 8 4 
was rendered harmless. Martineau v. Ander-
son, 636 P.2d 1039 (Utah 1981). 
Refusal to grant mistrial. 
The burden is on the appellant to show affir-
matively that the refusal to grant a mistrial 
was error prejudicial to his case. Burton v. 
Zions Co-op. Mercantile Inst., 122 Utah 360, 
249 P.2d 514 (1952). 
Service of summons. 
This rule cannot be used as a catch-all to 
cover up defects, errors, or omissions upon 
which the rights and duties of adverse parties 
depend, and where deputy failed to date sum-
mons left with defendant, the summons was 
defective under Rule 4(j), and the defect could 
not be regarded as a mere irregularity. Rees v. 
Scott, 8 Utah 2d 134, 329 P.2d 877 (1958). 
Failure of the person serving a summons to 
endorse upon the copy of the summons served 
the date of service substantially affects the 
rights of the person served and is grounds for 
quashing the summons without further proof 
of harm. Rees v. Scott, 8 Utah 2d 134, 329 P.2d 
877 (1958). 
Substantiality of error. 
It is the duty of the Supreme Court to disre-
gard errors unless they are so substantial as to 
affect the rights of the parties or the likely out-
come of the case. Hi 11 yard v. Utah By-Products 
Co., 1 Utah 2d 143, 263 P.2d 287 (1953), over-
ruled on other grounds, Harris v. Utah Transit 
Auth., 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983) 
Only when there is error both substantial 
and prejudicial, and when there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the result would have been dif-
ferent without it, should error be regarded as 
sufficient to upset a judgment or to grant a new 
trial. Bowden v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 3 Utah 
2d 444, 286 P.2d 240 (1955); Batt v. State, 28 
Utah 2d 417, 503 P.2d 855 <1972). 
On appeal, the burden is upon the appellant 
not only to show that then; was error, but that 
the error was prejudicial to the extent that 
there is reasonable likelihood that in its ab-
sence there would have been a different result. 
Joseph v. W.H. Grows Latter-Day Saints 
Hosp., 10 Utah 2d 94, 348 P.2d 935 (-I960); 
Ortega v. Thomas, 14 Utah 2d 296, 383 P.2d 
406 (1963); Ewell & Son, Inc. v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 27 Utah 2d 188, 493 P.2d 1283 (1972); 
Redevelopment Agency v. Mitsui Inv. Inc., 522 
P.2d 1370 (Utah 1974). 
An appellate court will not reverse a judg-
ment for mere error, unless the error involved 
is substantial and prejudicial. Kesler v. 
Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 (Utah 1975). 
An error is harmful only if the likelihood of a 
different outcome is high enough to undermine 
confidence in the verdict. Crookston v. Fire Ins. 
Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). 
Trial error corrected in judgment. 
A buyer under a conditional sales contract 
was not prejudiced by a conclusion of law in 
which inadvertently no credit had been given 
to him for an amount that was due to him, and 
according to which the seller was thus entitled 
to a judgment in a certain larger sum, where 
the court, in arriving at its judgment, correctly 
credited to the buyer the amount that was due 
to him, and entered judgment only for the dif-
ference. Knudsen Music Co. v. Masterson, 121 
Utah 252, 240 P.2d 973 (1952). 
Cited in State v. Geurts, 11 Utah 2d 345, 
359 P.2d 12 (1961); Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah 
2d 364, 412 P.2d 451 (1966); Estate of 
McFarland v. Holt, 18 Utah 2d 127, 417 P.2d 
244 (1966); Bank of Pleasant Grove v. Johnson, 
552 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1976); Rigtrup v. Straw-
berry Water Users Ass'n, 563 P.2d 1247 (Utah 
1977); Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828 
(Utah 1980); State ex rel. K.K.H., 610 P.2d 849 
(Utah 1980); Chournos v. D'Agnillo, 642 P.2d 
710 (Utah 19H2); Made.sen v. Brown, 701 P.2d 
1086 (Utah 1985); Chandler v. Mathews, 734 
P.2d 907 (Utah 1987); Mountain States Tel. & 
Tel. v. Sohm, 755 P.2d 155 (Utah 19*8/, 
Painter v. Painter, 752 P.2d 907 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988); Belden v. O^.. H e . 752 P.2d 
1317 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); King v. _ ui, 770 
P.2d 975 (Utah 1988); Mann v. Wadswoiui, 
776 P.2d 926 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Ostler v. 
Albina Transf. Co., 781 P.2d 445 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989); Marshall v. Van Gerven, 790 P.2d 
62 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Huston v. Lewis, 818 
P.2d 531 (Utah 1991); Evans ex rel. Evans v. 
Doty, 824 P.2d 460 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); 
Steffensen v. Smith's Mgt. Corp., 820 P.2d 482 
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Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur . 2d Appeal and 
Error §§ 702, 776 to 819; 58 Am. Jur . 2d New 
Trial § 31. 
C.J .S. — 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 825 et 
seq.; 6^ C.J.S. New Trial § 13. 
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sured and will have to pay verdict himself as 
prejudicial error, 68 A.L.R.4th 954. 
Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error «=> 1025 
to 1074, 1170; New Trial «=» 27. 
Rule 62. Stay of proceedings to enforce a judgment. 
(a) Stay upon entry of judgment. Execution or other proceedings to en-
force a judgment may issue immediately upon the entry of the judgment, 
unless the court in its discretion and on such conditions for the security of the 
adverse party as are proper, otherwise directs. 
(b) Stay on motion for new trial or for judgment In its discretion and 
on such conditions for the security of the adverse party as are proper, the court 
may stay the execution of, or any proceedings to enforce, a judgment pending 
the disposition of a motion for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment 
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made pursuant to Rule 59, or of a motion for relief from a judgment or order 
made pursuant to Rule 60, or of a motion for judgment in accordance with a 
motion for a directed verdict made pursuant to Rule 50, or of a motion for 
amendment to the findings or for additional findings made pursuant to Rule 
52(b). 
(c) Injunction pending appeal. When an appeal is taken from an interloc-
utory or final judgment granting, dissolving, or denying an injunction, the 
court in its discretion may suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction 
during the pendency of the appeal upon such conditions as it considers proper 
for the security of the rights of the adverse party. 
(d) Stay upon appea l . When an appeal is taken the appellant by giving a 
supersedeas bond may obtain a stay, unless such a stay is otherwise prohib-
ited by law or these rules. The bond may be given at or after the time of filing 
the notice of appeal. The stay is effective when the supersedeas bond is ap-
proved by the court. 
(e) Stay in favor of the s ta te , o r agency thereof. When an appeal is 
taken by the United States, the state of Utah, or an officer or agency of either, 
or by direction of any department of either, and the operation or enforcement 
of the judgment is stayed, no bond, obligation, or other security shall be 
required from the appellant. 
(f) Stay in quo w a r r a n t o p roceed ings . Where the defendant is adjudged 
guilty of usurping, intruding into or unlawfully holding public office, civil or 
military, within this state, the execution of the judgment shall not be stayed 
on an appeal. 
(g) P o w e r of appe l la te c o u r t no t l imited. The provisions in this rule do 
not limit any power of an appellate court or of a judge or justice thereof to stay 
proceedings during the pendency of an appeal or to suspend, modify, restore, 
or grant an injunction, writ of mandate or writ of prohibition during the 
pendency of an appeal or to make any order appropriate to preserve the status 
quo or the effectiveness of the judgment subsequently to be entered. 
(h) Stay of judgment upon multiple c la ims. When a court has ordered a 
final judgment on some but not all of the claims presented in the action under 
the conditions stated in Rule 54(b), the court may stay enforcement of that 
judgment until the entering of a subsequent judgment or judgments and may 
prescribe such conditions as are necessary to secure the benefit thereof to tne 
party in whose favor the judgment is entered. 
(i) Excep t ing to sure t ies ; just i f icat ion; mul t ip le sure t ies ; depos i t in 
Heu of bond . The adverse party may except to the sufficiency of the sureties 
to the undertaking filed pursuant to the provisions of this rule at any time 
within 10 days after written notice of the filing of such undertakings; and, 
unless they or other sureties, within 10 days after service of the notice of such 
exception, justify before a judge of the court in which the judgment was en-
tered, or the clerk thereof, upon not less than five days' notice to the party 
excepting to such sureties of the time and place of justification, execution of 
the judgment is no longer stayed. In all cases where the bond required exceeds 
$2,000 and there are more than two sureties thereon, they may state in their 
affidavit, ^ t they are severally worth the amounts for which they agree to 
be found if leb* v. ,. +hat expressed in the undertaking, provided the whole 
amount ^ equivalent to tnat of two sufficient sureties. In all cases where an 
undertpkmg is required by these rules a deposit in court in the amount of such 
undertaking, or such lesser amount as the court may order, is equivalent to 
the filing of the undertaking 
(j) Waiver of u n d e r t a k i n g . In all cases the parties may by written stipula-
tion waive the requirements of this rule with resppct to the filing of a bond or 
undertaking. 
75-3-719 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 11 
personal representative's compensation or the attorney's com-
pensation and if no objection is filed by an interested person to 
the compensation requested, reasonable compensation shall 
be the compensation sought in the petition. When an inter-
ested person objects to the personal representative's compen-
sation, the court shall determine reasonable compensation for 
the personal representative based on the quality, quantity, 
and 'alue of the services rendered to the estate and the 
circumstances under which those services were rendered, 
including the practice for other fiduciaries who are in similar 
circumstances to the personal representative in question. 
When an interested person objects to the attorney's compen-
sation, the court shall determine reasonable compensation for 
the attorney based on rules adopted by the Judicial Council. 
(2) When a petition seeks approval of or objects to a 
personal representative's compensation or an attorney's com-
pensation, at least ten days before the time set for the hearing 
of the petition, the petitioner or the petitioner's attorney shall 
send a copy of the petition to all interested persons either by 
certified, registered, or first class mail or by hand-delivery. 
(3) If a will provides for compensation of the personal 
representative and there is no contract with the decedent 
regarding compensation, the personal representative may 
renounce the provision before qualifying and be entitled to 
reasonable compensation. A personal representative also may 
renounce his right to all or any part of the compensation. A 
written renunciation of fee may be filed with the court. 1982 
75-3-719. Expenses in estate litigation. 
If any personal representative or person nominated as 
personal representative defends or prosecutes any proceeding 
in good faith, whether successful or not, he is entitled to 
receive from the estate his necessary expenses and disburse-
ments, including reasonable attorneys' fees incurred. 1975 
75-3-720. Proceedings for review of employment of 
agents and compensation of personal repre-
sentatives and employees of estate. 
After notice to all interested persons, on petition of an 
interested person or on appropriate motion if administration 
is supervised, the propriety of employment of any person by a 
personal representative, including any attorney, auditor, in-
vestment advisor, or other specialized agent or assistant, the 
reasonableness of the compensation of any person so em-
ployed, or the reasonableness of the compensation determined 
by the personal representative for the personal representa-
tive's own services, may be reviewed by the court. Any person 
who has received excessive compensation from an estate for 




75-3-801. Notice to creditors. 
(1) Unless notice has already been given under this section, 
a personal representative upon his appointment shall publish 
a notice to creditors once a week for three successive weeks in 
a newspaper of general circulation in the county announcing 
the personal representative's appointment and address and 
notifying creditors of the estate to present their claims within 
three months after the date of the first publication of the 
notice or be forever barred. 
(2) A personal representative may give written notice by 
mail or other delivery to any creditor, notifying the creditor to 
present his claim within 90 days from the published notice if 
given as provided in Subsection (1) above or within 60 days 
from the mailing or other delivery of the notice, whichever is 
later, or be forever barred. Written notice shall be the mm 
described in Subsection (1) above or a similar notice. 
(3) The personal representative shall not be liable to ri| 
creditor or to any successor of the decedent for giving or faiial 
to give notice under this section. u | 
75-3-802. Statutes of limitations. 
Unless an estate is insolvent the personal representauaj 
with the consent of all successors whose interests would m 
affected, may waive any defense of limitations available to tid 
estate. If the defense* is not waived, no claim which was barn] 
by any statute of limitations at the time of the decedesal 
death shall be allowed or paid. The running of any statute ei 
limitations measured from some other event than death aa] 
advertisement for claims against a decedent is suspend*! 
during the three months following the decedent's death bq 
resumes thereafter as to claims not barred pursuant to tw 
sections which follow. For purposes of any statute of lixnUH 
tions, the proper presentation of a claim under Section 7541 
804 is equivalent to commencement of a proceeding on m 
claim. iff) 
75-3-803. Limitations on presentation of claims. 
(1) All claims against a decedent's estate which arose befo^  
the death of the decedent, including claims of the state aii 
any subdivision of it, whether due or to become due, absolute* 
or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, 
tort, or other legal basis, if not barred earlier by other statu** 
of limitations, are barred against the estate, the personal 
representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent* 
unless presented within the earlier of the following dates: 
(a) one year after the decedent's death; or 
(b) within the time provided by Subsection 75-3-801(23 
for creditors who are given actual notice, and where notice 
is published, within the time provided in Subsectic* 
75-3-801(1) for all claims barred by publication. 
(2) In all events, claims barred by the nonclaim statute it 
the decedent's domicile are also barred in this state. 
(3) All claims against a decedent's estate which arise at or 
after the death of the decedent, including claims of the staa 
and any of its subdivisions, whether due or to become due. 
absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on 
contract, tort, or other legal basis are barred against thi 
estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and deviseei 
of the decedent, unless presented as follows: 
(a) a claim based on a contract with the personal 
representative within three months after performance bj 
the personal representative is due; or 
(b) any other claim within the later of three monthi 
after it arises, or the time specified in Subsection (l)(a). 
(4) Nothing in this section affects or prevents: 
(a) any proceeding to enforce any mortgage, pledge, oi 
other lien upon property of the estate; 
(b) to the limits of the insurant protection only, anj 
proceeding to establish liability of the decedent or thi 
personal representative for which he is protected bj 
liability insurance; or 
(c) collection of compensation for services rendered and 
reimbursement for expenses advanced by the personal 
representative or by the attorney or accountant for the 
personal representative of the estate. lm 
75-3-804. Manner of presentation of claims. 
(1) Claims against a decedent's estate may be presented ai 
follows: 
(a) The claimant may deliver or mail to the persona 
representative, or the personal representative's attorne) 
of record, a written statement of the claim indicating IU 
basis, the name and address of the claimant, and th« 
amount claimed, or may file a written statement of th« 
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claim, in the form prescribed by rule, with the clerk of the 
court. The claim is deemed presented on either the receipt 
of the written statement of claim by the personal repre-
sentative or the personal representative's attorney of 
record, or the filing of the claim with the court, whichever 
occurs first. If a claim is not yet due, the date when it will 
become due shall be stated. If the claim is contingent or 
unliquidated, the nature of the uncertainty shall be 
stated. If the claim is secured, the security shall be 
described. Failure to describe correctly the security, the 
nature of any uncertainty, and the due date of a claim not 
yet due does not invalidate the presentation made. 
(b) The claimant may commence a proceeding against 
the personal representative in any court where the per-
sonal representative may be subjected to jurisdiction to 
obtain payment of the claim against the estate, but the 
commencement of the proceeding must occur within the 
time limited for presenting the claim. No presentation of 
claim is required in regard to matters claimed in proceed-
ings against the decedent which were pending at the time 
of the decedent's death. 
(2) If a claim is presented under Subsection (l)(a), no 
proceeding thereon may be commenced more than 60 days 
after the personal representative has mailed a notice of 
disallowance; but, in the case of a claim which is not presently 
due or which is contingent or unliquidated, the personal 
representative may consent to an extension of the 60-day 
period, or to avoid injustice the court, on petition, may order 
an extension of the 60-day period, but in no event may the 
extension run beyond the applicable statute of limitations. 
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75-3-805. Classification of claims. 
(1) If the applicable assets of the estate are insufficient to 
pay ail claims in full, the personal representative shall make 
payment in the following order: 
(a) Reasonable funeral expenses; 
(b) Costs and expenses of administration; 
(c) Debts and taxes with preference under federal law; 
(d) Reasonable and necessary medical and hospital 
expenses >f the last illness of the decedent, including 
compens juon of persons attending him; 
(e) Debts and taxes with preference under other laws of 
this state; 
(f) All other claims. 
(2) No preference shall be given in the payment of any claim 
over any other claim of the same class, and a claim due and 
payable shall not be entitled to a preference over claims not 
due. i&75 
15-3-806. Allowance of claims. 
[1) As to claims presented in the manner described in 
Section 75-3-804 and within the time limit prescribed in 
Section 75-3-803, the personal representative may mail a 
notice to any claimant stating that the claim has been allowed 
or disallowed. If, after allowing or disallowing a claim, the 
personal representative changes the decision concerning the 
claim, the personal representative shall notify the claimant. 
The personal representative may not change a disallowance of 
a claim after the time for the claimant to file a petition for 
allowance or to commence a proceeding on the claim has 
expired and the claim has been barred. If the notice of 
disallowance warns the claimant of the impending bar, a claim 
which is disallowed in whole or in part by the personal 
representative is barred so far as not allowed, unless the 
claimant seeks a court ordered allowance by filing a petition 
for allowance in the court or by commencing a proceeding 
against the personal representative not later than 60 days 
after the mailing of the notice of disallowance or partial 
allowance. If the personal representative fails to mail notice to 
a claimant of action on the claim within 60 days after the time 
for original presentation of the claim has expired, this failure 
has the effect of a notice of allowance. 
(2) Upon the petition of the personal representative or a 
claimant in a proceeding for this purpose, the court may order 
any claim presented to the personal representative or filed 
with the clerk of the court in a timely manner and not barred 
by Subsection (1) to be allowed in whole or in part. Notice of 
this proceeding shall be given to the claimant, the personal 
representative, and those other persons interested in the 
estate as the court may direct by order at the time the 
proceeding is commenced. 
(3) A judgment in a proceeding in another court against a 
personal representative to enforce a claim against a decedent's 
estate is a court ordered allowance of the claim. 
(4) Unless otherwise provided in any judgment in another 
court entered against the personal representative, allowed 
claims bear interest at the legal rate for the period commenc-
ing six months after the decedent's date of death unless based 
on a contract making a provision for interest, in which case 
they bear interest in accordance with that provision. 1992 
75-3-807. Payment of claims. 
(1) Upon the expiration of the earliest of the time limita-
tions provided in Section 75-3-803 for the presentation of 
claims, the personal representative shall proceed to pay the 
claims allowed against the estate in the order of priority 
prescribed, after making provision for homestead, family, and 
support allowances, for claims already presented which have 
not yet been allowed or whose allowance has been appealed, 
and for unbarred claims which may yet be presented, includ-
ing costs and expenses of administration. By petition to the 
court in a proceeding for the purpose, or by appropriate motion 
if the administration is supervised, a claimant whose claim 
has been allowed but not paid as provided in this section may 
secure an order directing the personal representative to pay 
the claim to the extent that funds of the estate are available 
for the payment. 
(2) The personal representative at any time may pay any 
just claim that has not been barred, with or without formal 
presentation, but he is personally liable to any other claimant 
whose claim is allowed and who is injured by such payment if: 
(a) the payment was made before the expiration of the 
time limit stated in Subsection (1) and the personal 
representative failed to require the payee to give ad-
equate security for the refund of any of the payment 
necessary to pay other claimants; or 
(b) the payment was made, due to the negligence or 
willful fault of the personal representative, in such mane 
ner as to deprive the injured claimant of his priority. 
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75-3-808. Individual liability of personal representa-
tive. 
(1) Unless otherwise provided in the contract, a personal 
representative is not individually liable on a contract properly 
entered into in his fiduciary capacity in the course of admin-
istration of the estate unless he fails to reveal his representa-
tive capacity and identify the estate in the contract. 
(2) A personal representative is individually liable for obli-
gations arising from ownership or control of the estate or for 
torts committed in the course of administration of the estate 
only if he is personally at fault. 
(3) Claims based on contracts entered into by a personal 
representative in his fiduciary capacity, on obligations arising 
from ownership or control of the estate, or on torts committed 
in the course of estate administration may be asserted against 
the estate by proceeding against the personal representative 
in his fiduciary capacity, whether or not the personal repre-
sentative is individually liable therefor. 
